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Legal Standards and Economic Analysis in Antitrust 
Enforcement: An Empirical Investigation for the Case of 
Greece 
 
Kelly Benetatou* and Yannis Katsoulacos† 
 
ABSTRACT  
The purpose of this paper is to explain the choice of legal standards of the Hellenic 
Competition Authority (HCC) concerning antitrust enforcement and the impact of this on the 
judicial review of the decisions reached. This paper is based on the methodology presented 
in a paper by Katsoulacos Y., S. Avdasheva, and S. Golovaneva (2019), which measures 
empirically the extent of economic analysis used and the legal standards (LSs) adopted by 
Competition Authorities (CAs). The methodology is applied to the appealed investigations of 
the HCC. In contrast to the theoretical analyses, systematic empirical assessments of LSs have 
been very limited. There are case studies based on particular decisions or meta-analysis of a 
group of decisions, but there is no statistical representation of the legal standards applied by 
competition authorities. The absence of empirical measurement and statistics on legal 
standards limits our ability to answer important questions. Thus, it makes any international 
comparisons of LSs applied in different jurisdictions and judgments on the role of economic 
analysis speculative. Further, it impedes the analysis of the evolution of LSs over time and 
explaining the factors that drive this evolution. Both issues are important for the identification 
of the deviation of legal standards actually applied in competition cases from their optimal 
level. For the purposes of this paper we collected and analysed a dataset of antitrust 
infringement decisions reached by the HCC, between 1997-2017, which were appealed to 
Courts for annulment. Our main objectives have been to use this dataset to examine to what 
extent economic analysis and evidence is used in the decisions of the HCC and how it evolves 
over time. Also, we examine how changes in the extent of economic analysis or variations in 
LSs, for any given conduct, is related to (how it affects) the probability that decisions on that 
conduct are annulled in appellate courts, as well as the effect of movements in LSs – from per 
se toward effects-based – on litigation costs and the duration of litigation. We show that on 
average, economic analysis still plays a very modest role in the investigations, as HCC applies 
close to per se legal standards even when assessing conducts for which effects-based LSs 
would be more suitable. There is no discernible evolution toward a more effect-based 
approach during the period 1995-2017. Further, the choice of LSs for specific conducts can 
create considerable legal uncertainty for firms about how these conducts will be assessed by 
the HCC. Overall, our empirical findings indicate low quality of enforcement. Our results are 
consistent with recent arguments, according to which, the higher disputability of decisions as 
a result of increasing the extent of economic analysis under effects-based LSs, increases the 
annulment rates of decisions under appeal. 
Keywords: Competition policy, legal standards, Greece 
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1. Introduction: factors that influence the choice of LSs – a brief 
review  
  
In recent years, the debate on competition policy has focused on the role played by economics 
in improving the analysis of antitrust enforcement and merger cases. The discussion has raised 
issues concerning the legal standards (LSs) that should be adopted and remains still very 
controversial3.  
Katsoulacos and Ulph in a series of papers (2009, 2011, 2015 and 2016) have attempted, by 
using a maximization-of-welfare framework, to provide answers on how a number of 
fundamental factors – such as decision errors and deterrence effects – affect the choice of the 
(optimal) legal standard4 and hence, indirectly, the appropriate role and extent of economic 
analysis in Competition Law (CL) enforcement. Their analyses point quite strongly to the view 
that for a range of conducts – which now are understood not to be strongly presumptively 
illegal and for which the developments in economic theory and modeling in the last 20 or so 
years significantly improved the discriminating quality of the assessment – moving to 
assessment with effects-based standards will improve welfare. This is due to a reduction in the 
costs of decision errors and an improvement in deterrence effects. But, as is widely recognized, 
the legal standards actually adopted in many countries – most importantly in the EU and its 
member states – remain close to per se (and the extent of economic analysis applied by the 
vast majority of CAs today remains low) for cases in which effects-based LSs would be 
considered more appropriate from the point of view of welfare maximisation. This is 
particularly so for abuse of dominance cases.  
This implies that the arguments concerning decision errors, deterrence effects, as well as legal 
uncertainty and administrative costs, are not the only – or even the most important – in 
considering the choice of legal standards. In practice, other factors must be important. In some 
more recent papers, these are at the center of the analysis (Katsoulacos, 2019a, b and 
Katsoulacos, Avdasheva and Golovanova, 2019). One is related to the objectives of CAs, 
specifically the reputational concerns of those deciding the enforcement procedures that are 
affected by the judicial review of the CA’s decisions. As a result of these concerns, CAs will make 
their choice, taking into account what they anticipate the Courts’ choice of legal standard will 
be. Given this, it must also be recognized that the choice of legal standard is dependent on the 
substantive standard (“SS”) adopted by Courts. While in academic discussions this is usually 
assumed to be welfarist (liability requiring a showing of adverse effects on welfare5), in practice 
this is often not the case. For example, the substantive standard may be just to “protect the 
economic freedom of market participants”, or the pursuit of a “system of undistorted 
competition” (Wils, 2014) without obligation to show adverse effects on consumer welfare or 
                                                     
3 For discussions and empirical information concerning the use and usefulness of economics in competition law 
enforcement see Baker (2003), Gavil (2008), Neven (2006), Schinkel (2008) and Lianos (2012). 
4 Extensive references and reviews of the literature related to these issues are contained in these papers. See also 
J Padilla (2011), page 435.  
5 Consumer or total welfare – see also below.  
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efficiency (Rey and Venit, 2015). This would imply that any conduct that puts one or more 
competitors at a disadvantage would be considered unlawful6, irrespective of the ultimate 
consequences of the conduct for welfare7. The link between substantive standards and the 
choice of legal standards has been discussed recently and it has been demonstrated 
(Katsoulacos, 2019a) that adopting non-welfarist substantive standards increases the likelihood 
that per se legal standards are applied and a limited amount of economic analysis and evidence 
is utilized in investigations of specific conducts.  
In contrast to the theoretical analyses, systematic empirical assessments of LSs have been very 
limited. There are case studies based on particular decisions or meta-analysis of a group of 
decisions, but there is no statistical representation of the legal standards applied by 
competition authorities. The absence of empirical measurement and statistics on legal 
standards limits our ability to answer important questions. Thus, it makes any international 
comparisons of LSs, applied in different jurisdictions and judgments on the role of economic 
analysis, speculative. Further, it impedes the analysis of the evolution of LSs over time and 
explaining the factors that drive this evolution. Both issues are important for the identification 
of the deviation of legal standards actually applied in competition cases from their optimal 
level. 
For the purposes of this paper we collected and analysed a dataset of 77 antitrust infringement 
decisions reached by the Hellenic CA – the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) between 
1997-20178, which were appealed before administrative courts for annulment. Our main 
objectives have been to use this dataset to examine the following: 
1. Measure to what extent economic analysis and evidence is used in the decisions of the HCC 
and how it evolves over time. This can be compared to the “optimal” level of economic 
analysis for any given conduct that would be applied if the appropriate9 (“optimal”) Legal 
Standard (LS) for that conduct was adopted. We develop a number of indices10. First, we 
measure the Weighted Average Legal Standard (WALS) adopted for each potentially 
anticompetitive conduct-type (the weights being the share of each legal standard used in 
assessing each conduct-type) and the degree of concentration (CONC) for the WALS of each 
conduct-type. The higher the CONC, the greater the concentration on specific LSs when 
                                                     
6 The meaning of “preserving undistorted competition” was actually made clear by the EU General Court which, 
upholding in its entirety the Commission’s Decision on Intel, argued that making it more difficult for a rival to 
compete “in itself suffices for a finding of infringement”.  
7 Rey and Venit (2015) note that the effects-based standard starts with a showing of a distortion of the competitive 
process but, in order to assess this distortion and find liability, one “should (also) look at the actual or likely effects 
of the conduct“, on consumer welfare or efficiency (p. 17, italics ours). Note that here we will not try to examine 
the pros and cons of using “consumer welfare” or “total welfare / efficiency” as the right substantive standard. 
There is currently quite an intense debate on this issue, with some economists arguing for a total welfare standard, 
e.g. D. Carlton (2007). For a recent contribution also containing a review of the recent debate see Katsoulacos, 
Metsiou and Ulph (2016). Also, CAs often take into account the presence of “public interest concerns” as additional 
liability criteria. 
8 Decisions issued up to 12/2017. 
9 As inferred by the recent relevant literature. 
10 Indices presented in the paper of Avdasheva S., Golovaneva S. and Katsoulacos Y. (2019). 
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assessing specific conducts and hence the greater the certainty with which it can be 
anticipated that a specific LS will be used in the future to assess a conduct. The standard 
deviation of WALS is another measure of the uncertainty that surrounds the anticipated LS 
for a conduct. Finally, we develop indices for quality of enforcement, measuring the 
deviation of WALS from its optimal level11. 
2. Examine how changes in the extent of economic analysis or variations in LSs, for any given 
conduct, is related to (how it affects) the probability that decisions on that conduct are 
annulled in appellate courts. That is, examine empirically the probability of annulment as a 
function of the LS adopted12.  
3. Examine the effect of movements in LSs from per se towards effects-based on litigation 
costs and the duration of litigation13.  
 
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that on average the HCC applies a moderate 
degree of economic analysis, closer to the amount under per se (TEB) legal standards. 
Additionally, the legal standards are not applied in a consistent way. In investigations of similar 
conducts, the legal standards applied vary quite substantially, creating high levels of legal 
uncertainty for firms that we measure empirically and compare across different conduct 
groups. Overall, with the exception of price fixing and market sharing conducts, the quality of 
enforcement (measured by the deviation of the LSs adopted from the theoretical optimum) has 
been – and remains throughout the period investigated – very low. 
Next, our results indicate that when legal standards adopted by the HCC are low (Strict per se 
– as defined below) higher legal standards may decrease the likelihood of decisions being 
annulled: consistent with the hypothesis that adopting very low legal standards is considered 
“wrong” by the courts. Simultaneously, we provide evidence that significantly increasing the 
extent of economic analysis leads to an increase in the annulment rate of decisions14. Our 
results are thus (at least in most cases) consistent with the existence of a U-shaped relationship 
between LSs and the probability of annulment: higher legal standards decrease and then 
increase the likelihood of decisions being annulled. This can be supported theoretically as 
showing that, for example, the HCC adopts the “wrong” (lower) LSs in many cases when courts’ 
standards are close to what we term ‘Truncated Effects-Based’ (TEB), but follow the courts 
                                                     
11 The indices are given in Tables  
Table 5 -  
Table 9. 
12 Results on this are contained in  
 
Table 10. 
13 Results on this are contained in  
Table 12. 
14 It is important to notice here that we count in annulled decisions only decisions annulled for substantive reasons 
(not procedural reasons).  
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when the LS is higher than TEB. When LSs are higher than TEB (and closer to full effects-based), 
the increase in the disputability of decisions increases the probability of annulment15.  
Finally, we show that an increase in legal standards leads to additional costs of enforcement 
for competition authorities. Specifically, in terms of the time necessary for litigation to be 
completed, decisions in which HCC applies analysis close to a TEB LS take longer than decisions 
based on MPS legal standards.  
Overall, our results are consistent with recent theoretical predictions concerning the choices 
made by a reputation maximizing authority, whose reputation (and, hence, utility) is decreasing 
in accordance with the annulment rate of its decisions under appeal and which is operating 
under increasing enforcement costs as LSs move closer to effects-based (Katsoulacos, 2019a).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 0, we provide a brief overview 
of the methodology used to construct our database and measure the extent of economic 
analysis (LSs). Then, we briefly describe HCC’s Enforcement Rules; this review helps us interpret 
the findings of qualitative and quantitative analysis on effects-based indicators and the factors 
affecting legal standards. Also, section 0, contains the empirical analysis undertaken and a 
detailed discussion of the results obtained related to objectives 1-3 described above. Section 0 
concludes.  
2. Identifying the extent of economic analysis and legal standards in 
competition law enforcement: a methodology 
2.1 Types of economic analysis applied in competition law enforcement 
The methodology, referred in the paper of Katsoulacos Y., Avdasheva S. and Golovaneva S. 
(2019), begins with the assumption that there are variations between pure per se (or pure 
object-based) and full effects-based (or full Rule of Reason) decision rules. According to their 
opinion, it is probably best to think of legal standards as forming a continuum at the extremes 
of which are the strict per se (or object based) and the (“full”) effects-based (or full rule of 
reason) standards (these variants are discussed in more detail below).  
In order to capture the differentiation and complexity of decision rules, the authors propose a 
set of indicators aligned with the case law tests broadly used in competition textbooks. They 
identify the important components of economic analysis that are necessary to substantiate in 
a specific investigation, how the relevant market has been defined, how market power raising 
or exclusionary effects have been shown, how efficiency effects have been proven and what is 
ultimately the welfare impact of the conduct. Then, they analyze the documents on particular 
decisions made by a CA and identify whether a component (or one or more of its sub-
components) of economic analysis has been undertaken or not. They suggest that all of the 
                                                     
15 See discussion below on the argument that increasing LSs close to full effects-bases increases the disputability 
of decisions and thus leads to an increase in annulment rates [Neven (2006), Katsoulacos, Makri and Metsiou 
(2018) and Katsoulacos (2019a)].  
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information could be extracted from texts of appealed decisions and they assign a value – 
“Yes=1 (in case the analysis has been undertaken)” or “No=0 (otherwise)” – to the variable 
corresponding to a component of economic analysis. 
The methodology identifies four broad components or categories of economic analysis (A, B, C 
and D in  
 
Table 1) that must be performed for the investigation to constitute an effect-based (or rule-of-
reason) analysis. One or more variables (sub-components) make up every one of these main 
categories of economic analysis (e.g. sub-components B.1, B.2, C.1 etc; see  
 
Table 1). Taking into account the fact that non-exploitative and exploitative conducts require 
different blocks of economic analysis, different analysis variables are used in each of these two 
conduct categories. They abstract variables that could be included in the assessment of each 
specific conduct type, among the many of the non-exploitative conducts category, from 
differences in the analysis – assuming that these are about the same. 
The statements – in which the authors assign (0/1) – under consideration are: 
 
Table 1: Types of economic analysis taken into account in the construction of the indicators 
of the extent of economic analysis [or of the Effects-Based (EB) indicators]16 
 
Restrictions of 
competition other than 
Exploitative conducts 
Exploitative conducts 
 
Statement 
Category 
Statement 
Description 
 Score 
A Discussion of 
the nature and 
characteristics 
of the conduct 
Comment: Since in all cases there must be some 
discussion of the nature and characteristics of the 
conduct, we should not get a score of “0” here – in 
this sense perhaps this category is not needed.  
It is included for purely formal reasons, to remind 
ourselves that an overall score of “1” is a strict per 
se approach to the assessment and that this means 
that the CA only considered the nature and 
characteristics of the conduct. 
0/1 
B Market Analysis 
                                                     
16 For details see Katsoulacos et.al. (2019). 
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Restrictions of 
competition other than 
Exploitative conducts 
Exploitative conducts 
 
Statement 
Category 
Statement 
Description 
 Score 
B.1 Basic analysis of 
market 
characteristics 
based on 
available market 
statistics 
Comment: Economic theory is even necessary in 
order for a CA to “frame” a case. This typically 
involves information about the structure of the 
industry, the firms, the structure of demand and the 
technology, determination of market shares 
(without formal analysis of market definition). It is 
the first step in an economic analysis in the context 
of a competition case. 0/1 
 or B.2. Formal market 
delineation and 
market share 
Determination, 
based on 
Hypothetical 
Monopolist 
methodology17 
Comment: Market definition decisions based not on 
qualitative assertions but on more sophisticated 
economic tests (e.g. SSNIP test, Price correlation 
and Critical loss analysis) 
C Evidence on restrictions of competition/ harm imposed 
C.1. Analysis 
undertaken in 
order to identify 
whether 
conduct has 
market power 
enhancing (e.g. 
through 
agreements) or 
exclusionary 
effects (e.g. in 
monopolization 
practices) 
Comment: This need not 
include the construction of 
a formal model (e.g. 
examination of incentive 
compatibility constraints in 
a concerted practice case, 
or examination of how 
exclusive contracts could 
lead to exclusion or 
prevent entry in the 
specific context, or 
“equally efficient 
competitor test”). But must 
indicate a serious effort to 
demonstrate the presence 
of such effects. 
Comment: Analysis 
undertaken to 
compare price with 
cost  
0/1 
                                                     
17 Note that in decisions where formal market definition B.2 is provided, then B.1 must also be given a score 1. The 
authors emphasise that B.1=0, when CA’s decisions only mention briefly what is considered to be the product and 
geographic market (e.g. on decisions on price fixing conducts, concerted practices). 
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Restrictions of 
competition other than 
Exploitative conducts 
Exploitative conducts 
 
Statement 
Category 
Statement 
Description 
 Score 
C.2. Articulation of 
theory of harm 
to consumer 
welfare (without 
taking into 
account of 
efficiencies) 
Comment: When “scoring” 
CAs decisions this need not 
be a full-blown formal 
analysis, but one could also 
score some effort towards 
determining where the 
case stands on the basis of 
assessing crucial aspects of 
the situation e.g. assessing 
the size of non-contestable 
demand of a dominant 
firm, negative impact on 
consumers. 
Comment: 
Comparison of the 
prices of the 
dominant supplier 
with the prices in 
other markets 
0/1 
C.3. Analysis of 
potential 
efficiency 
defense 
Comment: Analysis should 
be based on efficiencies 
that are expected to result 
from conduct that will 
create benefits to 
consumers (again, this 
need not be very 
sophisticated but must 
indicate a serious effort to 
take efficiencies into 
account). Analysis of 
potential Efficiency 
Defense relating to factors 
that tend to prevent a price 
rise or other harm to 
consumers. Counterfactual 
analysis18 may be 
undertaken under any of 
the C components – though 
this is not strictly necessary 
Comment: 
Comparison of the 
prices of the 
dominant supplier 
with the price of 
competitors 
0/1 
                                                     
18 I.e. Analysis proposing that theory of harm does not stand and demonstrating the absence of foreclosure effects 
and consumer harm of an exclusionary conduct. 
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Restrictions of 
competition other than 
Exploitative conducts 
Exploitative conducts 
 
Statement 
Category 
Statement 
Description 
 Score 
for considering the effect 
as established. 
C.4.   Comment: Excess 
profitability analysis 
0/1 
D More effects-based analysis to support robustness of C 
D Balancing of 
potential 
anticompetitive 
effects of 
conduct with 
the efficiencies 
and 
determination 
of the final 
impact of 
consumers (or 
on total welfare) 
Comment: This is any 
analysis “over and above” 
the analysis that may have 
been included under 
“efficiencies” above (taking 
into account efficiencies 
that need not impact 
consumers, especially in 
the short-term) . By 
“balancing” here we mean 
any formal economic 
analysis that attempts to 
measure the net effect of 
the conduct, that may not 
be related to efficiencies - 
e.g. balancing the short-
term and long-term 
implications of refusal to 
license (or of compulsory 
licensing) an innovative 
activity. 
Comment: Analysis of 
welfare effects of 
exploitative conduct. 
0/1 
Total Score 6 7  
Source: Katsoulacos et.al (2019) 
 
Note that the value (1 or 0) of an analysis variable (e.g. of B.2 or C.2 etc.) is based on a judgment 
whether the relevant analysis has been undertaken or not and it says nothing about the 
correctness or “quality” of the analysis or of the data used. In other words, the value of an 
analysis variable indicates whether the competition authority, in the particular case, has tried 
to address the specific question associated with that analysis variable. 
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2.2 Effect-based scores and types of legal standards 
Following the above methodology, Avdasheva, Golovaneva and Katsoulacos (2019) suggest to 
construct the effects based scores (hereinafter EBS) using the 6 statements above (for non-
exploitative practices). EBS are calculated as the sum of the analysis variables presented in  
 
Table 1 – with a minimum of 119 and a maximum of 6. The question is: Is it reasonable for 
undertaking empirical analysis to use data that aggregate scores over many different conducts 
(e.g. all the non-exploitative conducts)? 
The answer is that a straight aggregation of scores across different conduct types will not 
provide indicators which can be used to undertake meaningful empirical analysis of the extent 
of economic analysis and type of LSs adopted. Such aggregate indicators cannot meaningfully 
be used to measure whether economic analysis is used “optimally”, since optimal LSs can only 
be defined at the level of each conduct. Furthermore, such aggregate indicators cannot be used 
to make comparisons between different countries. The level of the aggregate indicator will 
depend on the composition of conduct types, which will be different for different countries, 
and will change over time. For example, an EBS indicator score of 2.91 for both Greece and 
France certainly does NOT mean that the extent of economic analysis relative to some optimal 
level is the same in Greece and France given that the composition of conduct types may well 
be completely different between the two countries20. Moreover, such aggregate indicators 
cannot be used to examine how changes in the economic analysis – if measured by changes in 
the value of the aggregate indicator – affect the annulment rate, since the latter is expected to 
be influenced by what “type” of economic analysis21 is utilized and how this changes. 
Additionally, a given value of the aggregate indicator cannot reflect what “types” of analysis 
are utilized and – when the value of the indicator changes – what “type” of economic analysis 
is responsible for the change in the indicator’s value.  
Empirical researchers can respond in two ways to the above difficulties for undertaking 
empirical analysis. One way is to increase the available data for each conduct type, e.g. by 
putting together different countries, and constructing indicators for each conduct type22 – 
using a table (that may be very similar to  
 
                                                     
19 There must always be some discussion at least of the nature and the characteristics of the conduct. 
20 E.g. in France there may be proportionally many more decisions on conduct types for which the appropriate LS is 
Per Se or close to Per Se.  
21 For example, different types of economic analysis can lead to a score 3 and different ways of increasing economic 
analysis can increase the score from 3 to 4 but the implications of each case for the rate of annulment may not be 
the same.   
22 The amount of data for each conduct type, e.g. bundling, among those in the non-exploitative conducts category, 
is quite small for any one country for undertaking empirical analysis.  
 
10 
Table 1) which identifies the analysis variables for the specific conduct type. This is not an 
approach without difficulties; one of which is the collection of enough data from different 
countries23.  
A second way24 that we report in this section, is to concentrate on the data of one country 
(Greece). Then, rather than just using the EBS described above, using EB scores that result from 
aggregation across conduct types, but when aggregating we make sure that we assign the same 
score to different decisions only when the same amount and the same “type” of economic 
analysis is undertaken. We follow this procedure below for all non-exploitative conducts in a 
bundle (these include horizontal and vertical agreements and exclusionary conduct25).   
According to this procedure, we use the analysis variables that describe the different steps of 
economic analysis that are utilized in antitrust investigations, ordered – as in  
 
Table 1 above – in a sequence that represents what most economists would recognize as 
successively increased application of economic analysis. That is, as we move from strict per se 
to full effects-based LS.  
 
Table 1 describes additional blocks of analysis applied. This is very useful when we come to map 
the extent of economic analysis applied in a specific case to the legal standard adopted in that 
case. However – while we consider the order of statements above to reflect a common (or 
“natural”) order in which economic analysis is applied as we move from “low” (per se) to “high” 
(effects-based) legal standards – this order cannot be considered as unique for the assessment 
of all conducts in practice. Indeed, the statements described in  
 
Table 1 distinguish between what is a reasonably good set for all conducts other than 
exploitative and another set of statements, given for exploitative conducts26. 
                                                     
23 At this point we are collecting data on antitrust decisions in 2 countries and we hope that in the future we will be 
able to aggregate data from more (different) countries and thus extend our sample and to follow up on this 
approach. 
24 Which is, indeed, complementary to also using data from different countries together. 
25 There are significant common elements in the assessment of these conducts to justify using a unified 
methodology for constructing EB-indicators. Of course we could distinguish (additionally) between two 
sub-categories of anticompetitive agreements and exclusionary conduct (and, can disaggregate even 
further) and construct EB-indicators for each of these more disaggregated conduct categories. As already 
noted, the main disadvantage of disaggregating further is that disaggregation leads to smaller samples 
with which to undertake statistical work.  
26 However, note that this does not necessarily imply, when in the text of a decision we find some analysis 
of a higher level (in the sequence), that lower level analyses have been included and has also been explicitly 
described in the decision text. This is particularly important with regard to the statements B relating to 
the Contextual Analysis of the Market and the Firms. We believe that an analysis putting forward a 
theory of harm even if it is not preceded by an explicit description of the market in the decision text, will 
be based on developing some understanding of market characteristics and conditions. 
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Given these points, the aggregate EB indicator that will be used below is obtained by 
constructing the following Sets of EB analysis (SEB) which, hereafter, we will also term Legal 
Standard Indicators (LSI), using the statements in  
 
Table 1: 
S1: this contains all the infringement decisions in the sample in which we find “1”scores just for 
the A statement (for all other statements score is “0”).  
S2: this contains all the decisions in which we find “1”scores for the A statement and for the B 
statement (for all other statements score is “0”). 
S3: this contains all the decisions in which we find “1” scores for the A statement and for the B 
statement and for the C1 statement (for all other statements score is “0”). 
S4:  this contains all the decisions in which we find “1” scores for the A statement and for the 
B statement and for the C1 statement and for the C2 statement (for all other statements score 
is “0”). 
S5:  this contains all the decisions in which we find “1” scores for the A statement and for the 
B statement and for the C1 statement and for the C2 statement and for the C3 statement (for 
all other statements score is “0”). 
S6: this contains all the decisions in which we find “1” scores for the A statement and for the B 
statement and for the C1 statement and for the C2 statement and for the C3 statement and for 
the D statement (for all other statements score is “0”). 
Thus, by construction, our (new) aggregate EB-indicator with a value of 1 is represented by the 
set of decisions S1: that is, 1 is the value of the indicator when, in decisions, only block of 
analysis A is undertaken. Our aggregate EB-indicator with a value of 2 is represented by the set 
of decisions S2: that is, 2 is the value of the indicator when, in decisions, only block of analysis 
A and B is undertaken. Our aggregate EB-indicator with a value of 3 is represented by the set 
of decisions S3: that is, 3 is the value of the indicator when, in decisions, only block of analysis 
A, B and C1 is undertaken, etc.  
In particular, the authors identify the following sets of decisions Si,i=1,……6, as described above 
and the corresponding value of the aggregate EB-indicator for each set are: 
S1: {A} – aggregate LSI - of value 1. 
S2: {A, B} - aggregate LSI - of value 2. 
S3: {A, B, C1} – aggregate LSI - of value 3. 
S4: {A, B, C1, C2} – aggregate LSI - of value 4. 
S5: {A, B, C1, C2, C3} – aggregate LSI - of value 5. 
S6: {A, B, C1, C2, C3, D} – aggregate LSI - of value 6. 
Now, by comparing the different sets of decisions, Si,i=1,……6 we can identify the effects of 
additional economic analysis. For example, by comparing decisions in S2 with decisions in S3, 
 
12 
we can identify the effect of adding the block of analysis C1; by comparing decisions in S3 with 
decisions in S4, we can identify the effect of adding the block of analysis C2. We are also able 
to identify the frequency with which the CA applies the analysis associated with each one of 
the sets in assessing different conduct types and hence infer the extent to which the CA favors 
a certain legal standard for the different conduct types (see below).  
Katsoulacos et al. (2019) distinguish between four main distinct legal standards that are 
intermediate between them, corresponding to the above mentioned (sets) scores of economic 
analysis (see  
Table 2 below). A brief description of the LSs follows. 
Under the Strict Per Se (SPS) LS the CA makes decisions on the basis only of the purely formal 
characteristics of the conduct under investigation, relying on strong presumptions about the 
implications of the general class of conducts to which the specific conduct belongs for welfare. 
Alternatively, one can say that under SPS LS the CA makes inferences about effects (on welfare) 
from the formal characteristics of the conduct and some basic analysis of the market.  
The Modified Per Se (MPS) LS can be considered as a per se rule, subject to a Significant Market 
Power requirement or, more generally, as supplementing per se by undertaking analysis of 
market characteristics. For example, when assessing conducts under abuse of dominance or in 
an information exchange agreement or in a concerted practice for which there is no strong hard 
evidence of collusion. Alternatively, one can say that under MPS LS the CA makes inferences 
about effects (on welfare) from the formal characteristics of the conduct, detailed analysis of 
market characteristics and – depending on the type of conduct – the implications of these on 
incentives for achieving sustainable collusion and/or on the assessment of market power.  
Truncated Effects Based (TEB) is a higher LS, under which decisions about whether or not there 
is liability in the case of a specific conduct are reached by establishing that the characteristics 
of the specific conduct and of the market in which it is undertaken are such that it belongs to a 
class of conducts that distort the competitive process by disadvantaging rivals (i.e. through 
exclusionary effects, widely defined) or by enhancing market power (as in a concerted practice 
case) and – assuming a welfarist substantive standard – by establishing that the conditions 
present are such that a strong presumption can be made of adverse welfare effects. 
Alternatively, one can say that under a TEB LS, the CA decides that there is liability by inferring 
adverse welfare effects from the potential of the conduct to distort the competitive process by 
disadvantaging rivals (i.e. through exclusionary effects, widely defined) or by enhancing market 
power (as in a concerted practice case).  
Finally, Full Effects Based (FEB) represents the LS under which a finding of liability relies on all 
potential anticompetitive (exclusionary or market power enhancing), all potential pro-
competitive effects of the specific conduct being assessed and compared27 as well as a showing 
of adverse effects on welfare (consumer or total) of this specific conduct to be established. 
                                                     
27 In summary and simplifying somewhat, under (strict) Per Se only conduct characteristics are examined and 
assessed, under MPS these are examined as well as market characteristics, under TEB additional analysis 
establishing exclusionary or market power enhancing effects is undertaken and under FEB the above are 
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Table 2: Mapping EBS to legal standards 
 
Presumed components of 
economic analysis applied in 
assessment 
SEB (or LSI) Legal Standards 
1 A S1 Strict Per Se (SPS): 
2 A, B S2 Modified Per Se (MPS): 
3 A, B, C.1 S3 
Truncated Effects Based 
(TEB): 
4 
A, B, C1, C2 
 
A, B, C1, C2, C3 
 
A, B, C1, C2, C3, D 
S4 
 
S5 
 
S628 
LSI = 4, Intermediate between 
Truncated and Full Effects 
Based (FEB) LS (ITFEB) 
LSI = 5, FEB  LS under 
Consumer Welfare SS 
LSI = 6, FEB LS under Total 
Welfare SS 
Source: Katsoulacos et.al (2019) 
3. Empirical investigation of the Greek Competition Authority 
3.1 The Greek context of competition law enforcement 
The Hellenic Competition Commission (“HCC”) is the authority responsible for the enforcement 
of Greek Law 3959/201129, "Protection of Free Competition" (hereinafter “Competition Act”), 
previously Law 703/1977, as well as of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU). According to the Explanatory Note by the Ministry accompanying 
Law 703/1977, its purpose was twofold. First, it aimed to protect free competition in the 
marketplace for the benefit of the economy in general and of consumers in particular30. Second, 
it intended to harmonize the Greek law with the EU (then EEC) legislation in this field, in view 
of Greece’s then prospective accession to the Common Market. 
                                                     
supplemented by additional analysis and evidence to establish the net effect of the specific conduct on some 
measure of welfare taking into account potential efficiencies.  
28 For practices other than exploitative. 
29 Year 2011 marked the abolition of Law 703/1977 (with consecutive amendments). 
30 There are no exclusions or exemptions from the general competition law (Law 3959/2011 which replaced Law 
703/1977). The only existing sectoral exclusion concerns the telecoms sector. EETT (Hellenic Telecommunications 
and Post Commission) is entrusted with the competences to act as the Competition Authority in the electronic 
communications market (fixed and mobile telephony, wireless communications and Internet access providers) and 
the postal services market (postal and courier service providers).    
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Pursuant to Law 2296/1995, the HCC is an Independent Administrative Authority with 
procedural and decision-making autonomy. Pursuant to Law 2837/2000, the HCC also enjoys 
financial autonomy. Furthermore, the Authority has a dualist structure, essentially comprising 
two bodies: the Directorate General for Competition (“Directorate-General”), which is 
conducting the investigations and the HCC Board, which is the decision-making arm of the 
Authority31. 
The HCC co-operates closely with the European Commission and the national competition 
authorities of EU Member States in order to enforce the EU competition rules, primarily in the 
context of the Regulation (EC) 1/2003. The HCC performs all of the enforcement actions of a 
designated National Competition Authority to apply national and EU competition rules, in 
accordance with Regulation (EC) 1/2003 (see Art. 5). It also has consultative powers in the area 
of identifying and removing regulatory barriers to competition. In particular, the HCC has broad 
enforcement powers in the area of collusive practices/cartels, abuses of dominance and merger 
control. In this context, the HCC may: make decisions upon finding an infringement of Article 1 
of the Competition Act and Article 101 TFEU and/or of Article 2 of the Competition Act and 
Article 102 TFEU and impose administrative fines; take interim measures in case of a suspected 
infringement of the above said articles; review prior notifications of envisaged mergers and 
acquisitions (merger control of concentrations); launch investigations and conduct dawn raids 
for the enforcement of antitrust and merger control rules; deliver opinions on competition 
issues, and conduct sector inquiries. 
In 2011, as a means of rationalizing the handling of complaints, the law finally permitted the 
prioritization of cases which meet certain criteria specified by the authority32, particularly 
taking into account “the public interest, the likely effect on competition, consumer protection, 
the newly introduced prescription period and the impact expected from the authority’s 
intervention”.  
The HCC is considered as a medium CA in terms of size. According to the latest data (2017), 57 
out of 84 members of its staff focus on competition enforcement, including 18 lawyers, 34 
economists and five having different backgrounds. 
Cases are dealt with by the two Economics Directorates (A and B) and the Legal Services 
Directorate, which report to the Director General. The Advocacy Unit is a separate unit, also 
reporting to the Director General. The legal and economic Directorates are organized by 
sectors, while there are no units dealing exclusively with specific types of cases (e.g. there is no 
merger-specific unit or directorate). As a result, all staff works on all areas of competition 
enforcement and on advocacy matters if necessary. Case teams are normally multi-disciplinary, 
including both lawyers and economists. In relation to the latter, the organization of the HCC’s 
                                                     
31 As a result, the Greek institutional arrangements preserved their basic quasi-judicial characteristics (including the 
exchange of rounds of written pleadings and a fully-fledged oral hearing before a separate decision-making body, 
with rights to examine witnesses, cross-examine etc.). 
32 See HCC Decision 525/VI/2011 on the Criteria for the Prioritization of Cases, issued on 7/7/2011 available at: 
http://www.epant.gr and press release of 18.05.2011, available at www.epant.gr/en/. As well as decision 
quantifying the criteria of 525/2011, i.e. HCC Decision 616/2015, available at 
www.epant.gr/Pages/DecisionDetail?ID=1647, and press release of 10.03.2016, available at www.epant.gr/en.  
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DG is quite unique in the EU: its Directorates are organized by the qualification of competition 
experts (lawyers – economist) and sectors and thus, instead of having a Chief Economist 
position, it has two Economists Directors.  
within a period of sixty days from notification, the decisions of the HCC may be challenged 
before the Athens Administrative Court of Appeals, which conducts a full review – judicial 
control of both substance and procedure – of the decisions of the HCC. In these cases, the 
Administrative Court of Appeal acts as a first instance court. The judgments of the 
Administrative Court of Appeals may be brought for judicial review (control of legality33) before 
the Council of State (Supreme Administrative Court – Conseil d’Etat). In this case the Council of 
State acts as a second (and last) instance court. There is no third instance for decisions issued 
by the HCC. The courts can exercise their powers and either uphold or annul the decision. The 
Athens Administrative Court of Appeals examines the case on the merits and may reduce the 
fine imposed by the HCC34. 
The HCC has been criticized for following a rather standard formalistic assessment of the 
conducts under investigation on the basis of (per se) legal rules in its decisions; the evaluation 
of potential anti-competitive practices does not rely on the examination of the effects or the 
impact of the specific practices on welfare (i.e. on effects-based legal standards). In 2018, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reviewed the development 
of competition law and policy in Greece and recommended that the HCC should (especially in 
abuse of dominance cases) conduct more economic analysis in assessing the effects of a given 
practice – in addition to the analysis conducted when defining markets35 – to improve the 
narrative of the case and the overall persuasiveness of the theory of harm. The empirical 
analysis of this paper supports the conclusion of the OECD review. 
The scarcity of use of sophisticated economic analysis (especially with regard to efficiency and 
effects analysis, such as the as efficient competitor test, counterfactual analysis, etc.) in 
infringement decisions could be attributed to several reasons, apart from the limited resources 
in personnel and time constraints. Before discussing the impact of economic evidence on the 
outcomes of appeals, one should also bear in mind that another factor effecting the degree of 
economic analysis undertaken is the fact that the HCC mainly follows the EU current and past 
cases and jurisprudence. 
Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 (in Appendix 1) show the evolution of the different types of 
decisions adopted by the HCC over time36. Out of the total of the HCC’s decisions37 (on Articles 
1 & 2 of the Competition Act 3959/2011), horizontal agreements represent about 40.3%, while 
                                                     
33 I.e. wrong application of the law, assuming as correct the factual basis. 
34 The new Competition Act (Law 3959/2011) provided that specialised competition chambers can be established 
at the Athens Administrative Court of Appeals, the aim being to further enhance the effectiveness of judicial review 
(not yet implemented; nonetheless, in practice, competition cases are adjudicated by specific chambers of the 
Court). 
35 OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy, 2018, Greece, p. 171 (available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/oecd-peer-reviews-of-competition-law-and-policy-greece-2018.htm).   
36 Cases from 1995-2017. Note that, in year 1995 no antitrust decision was examined; while in1996 no antitrust 
decision was concluded with infringement. 
37 Table 15. 
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vertical agreements represent 32.5%, and abuse of dominance cases 27.3% for the entire 
period.  
3.2 Specific features of the Greek dataset on competition enforcement38  
The information needed for the construction of our dataset was extracted from texts of HCC’s 
infringement decisions issued from 1997 to 2017 and recorded through “Yes = 1” or “No = 0” 
responses to the statements as described in the previous Section 0. As mentioned above, the 
HCC’s enforcement records focus on investigations pertaining to vertical agreements, abuses 
of dominance, horizontal collusion practices, as well as mergers of strategic nature which 
warranted more complex remedial action39. 
Table 14, in Appendix, presents the main infringement decision types. Out of a total of Article 
101 and Article 102 cases40, around 58% represents decisions finding an infringement (the total 
prohibition decisions). The commitment decisions41 account for a very small percentage of the 
total cases: about 7%.  
As we have already stated, concerning the structure of the sample according to the type of 
infringement, the HCC investigates overall more vertical and horizontal agreements (about 
73%42) than abuse of dominance cases. For the HCC the average duration of an investigation, 
in terms of the resources spent, is about 5-6 years (see  
Table 4 below, it is within the average for cases examined in the European Commission)43 from 
the submission of the complaint or the initiation of the ex officio investigation to the HCC’s final 
decision. Regarding appealed, challenged and annulled decisions, around 90% of the 
infringement decisions were appealed, while 30% of the appeals succeeded. 
 
Table 3: HCC’s decisions: total decisions v. decisions with infringements 
                                                     
38 Decisions issued up to 12/2017. Note that the full document of Court Decisions on HCC’s cases is available in its 
website, for Court cases issued from 2011 to date.  
39 Henceforth, for simplification reasons, instead of referring to national articles of competition law of Greece, we 
will refer to them as articles 101 & 102 of TFEU. 
40 i.e. 137, both infringement and acquittals decisions. 
41 HCC introduced the Settlement procedure for horizontal infringements of competition law in 2016 (see Decisions 
628/2016). 
42 Tables 13 and 15.Error! Reference source not found. 
43 In specific: horizontal agreements: 4 years, abuse of dominance cases: 5-6 years and vertical agreements 5 years. 
Based on comparative information from Global Competition Review for the period 2012 – 2016, the average 
duration of the HCC’s cartel investigations and abuse of dominance cases is longer than for some of the other 
authorities of comparable size or smaller (i.e. Belgium, Lithuania, Portugal and Switzerland). The average duration 
of cartel investigations and of abuse of dominance cases in these countries are 28 months and 29 months, 
respectively. However, this is a rough measure and does not take account of other factors that can affect duration, 
such as the number and complexity of cases each authority investigates simultaneously, procedural differences and 
time private parties require to provide fully responsive submissions. 
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Year 
Number of 
total 
antitrust 
decisions  
(art, 1 & 2) 
Number of 
infringement 
decisions 
(art, 1 & 2) 
Number of 
the claims to 
annul 
decisions 
(Court of 
Appeals / 
Council of 
State) 
 
% 
Number of 
finally annulled 
decisions  
(Court of 
Appeals / 
Council of State) 
44 
% 
199645 11      
1997 2 1 1 100% 1 100% 
1998 4      
1999 0      
2000 3 2 2 100% 2 100% 
2001 3      
2002 0 3 3 100% 2 67% 
2003 7 5 5 100% 2 40% 
2004 4 2 2 100% 1 50% 
2005 4 3 3 100% 1 33% 
2006 7 4 4 100% 2 50% 
2007 13 9 7 78% 3 43% 
2008 13 6 5 83% 1 20% 
2009 17 8 8 100% 3 38% 
2010 14 5 4 80%  0% 
2011 9 6 6 100% 2 33% 
2012 8 4 4 100%  0% 
2013 7 7 7 100%  0% 
2014 3 3 3 100%  0% 
2015 9 4 4 100% 1 25% 
                                                     
44 There are cases still pending before Greek Courts for the final decision, especially for years 2014-2017. In 
particular, Court decisions on 13 cases are still pending (8 in Court of Appeals and 5 in Supreme Court).  
45 Note that in 1996 and 1998, no antitrust decision was concluded with infringement, while in 1999 no antitrust 
decision was issued (see also Table 15 in Appendix). 
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Year 
Number of 
total 
antitrust 
decisions  
(art, 1 & 2) 
Number of 
infringement 
decisions 
(art, 1 & 2) 
Number of 
the claims to 
annul 
decisions 
(Court of 
Appeals / 
Council of 
State) 
 
% 
Number of 
finally annulled 
decisions  
(Court of 
Appeals / 
Council of State) 
44 
% 
2016 1      
2017 9 7 3 43%  0% 
Total 148 79 71 90% 21 30% 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
To describe and explain the essential features of the standards of proof of competition 
investigations, we combine qualitative and quantitative analyses. We use decisions of the HCC 
and the corresponding decisions by the Appellate Court and Supreme Administrative Court and 
attribute quantitative characteristics to these observations, including the following: 
 type of alleged infringement (abuse of dominance or agreements and concerted 
practice, Articles 101 and 102 of TFEU, respectively); 
 decisions that are considered as violating competition law both as “agreements” and as 
“unilateral exclusionary conduct”, i.e. those that fall under both Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU (we include them in both categories).  
 indicators of the court decisions (whether the court of first instance upholds or rejects 
the appeal, whether the parties appeal to a higher court, whether the higher court 
reverses the outcome of the decision of the first instance)46; 
 duration of the anti-competitive investigation47; 
 qualitative features of the alleged investigation.  
 
One drawback is the small sample of cases for which decisions have been issued by the CA 
[HCC: 148 decisions on cases, of which 79 (including decisions on exploitative practices) were 
concluded with an infringement decision. Out of these, 71 decisions were challenged before 
                                                     
46 Also note that in the published text of decisions we may not observe the total economic analysis undertaken by 
the CAs (in the meaning that usually decisions are much shorter and condensed than Statement of Objections, we 
are not public documents, however). 
47 Duration of investigation = date of the complaint / or initiation of an ex officio investigation to date of HCC 
decision. 
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courts] used to assess the quality and coherence of economic evidence used by the CA. The 
HCC’s decisions that are (finally) upheld by courts, rate to about 70%48. 
In the analysis below, we classify conducts by conduct groups. As mentioned above, we 
concentrate on non-exploitative practices. Thus, the conduct groups that we consider are:   
 conduct group G1: consists of violations of article 101, which have strong market power-
enhancing effects. They include price fixing, bid rigging, boycotts, market sharing and 
exclusive territories;  
 conduct group G2: includes concerted practices and coordination;   
 conduct group G3: are vertical restraints that, according to conventional wisdom, can 
have both competition restriction and welfare-enhancing effects; such as resale price 
maintenance (rpm min, rpm max), vertical exclusionary agreements, exclusive 
territories.  
 conduct group G4: consists of exclusive contracts, tying and non-price discrimination, 
but by dominant companies. 
 
The total number of observations for the above conducts (i.e. excluding exploitative abuses) in 
our dataset is 77. However, for constructing our aggregate EB indicators (EBS, or LSI) following 
the methodology described in previous Section 0, a number of decisions (in which “gaps” in 
economic analysis are present) could not be taken into account. As a result, the number of 
observations in our dataset drops to 69. 
In the analysis of legal standards in Greek antitrust enforcement, we also use groups of 
variables that reflect the following49:  
                                                     
48 I.e. 21 out of 71 HCC’s infringement decisions that claim to annul them are filed so far (we did not count for cases 
whose final decision is still pending in court). This rate concerns the substantive correctness of the HCC’s decisions, 
not the amount of the fine, which is usually partially amended (lowered) by court. The courts frequently lower the 
quantum of the fine. This is thought to happen partly when the courts are not fully persuaded of the robustness of 
the case and, partly, because the courts apply “proportionality” considerations to reflect concerns about the 
economic crisis and the undertakings’ difficulty to pay. Out of the total decisions upheld by the courts of first 
instance, the proportion of cases in which the courts reduce the fine varies significantly over the relevant period, 
ranging from 30% of cases in 2012 – 2013 to 70% in 2016 (due to financial crisis). 
49 Further from the above made assumptions analyzed when describing the indicators that we will use, we also 
made the following hypothesis: 
When assessing the values of the indicators we took into consideration also the above mentioned CA’s competition 
enforcement rules. 
We used both the texts of CA and court decisions. However in the “scorecard” we count only the evidence that 
each CA undertook. For example, if some additional analysis is submitted by company (defendants/complainant), 
we do not count it in the score. 
Parallel claims (e.g. in case of more than one defendants) to annul the same infringement decisions (which imply 
double-counting) are excluded from consideration (also cases that were concerned as partially annulled in 
substance, we considered them as annulled.). 
Most of the CA cases, in their first stage of investigation usually concerned mixed cases, i.e. cases with alleged 
infringements of both articles 101 (case of vertical agreements) and 102 (cases of abuse of dominance) TFEU 
(and/or the corresponding articles of each national competition law). In these cases we count, as mentioned above, 
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 Characteristics of violators (size) - this is captured by a dummy variable that depends 
on whether the company (or companies collectively, in cartel cases) possess market 
share above 50% of the Greek market (SIZE); 
 Whether or not monetary penalties (fines) are imposed on violators (MONPEN);  
 Whether or not infringement decisions are appealed by the involved parties 
(APPEALED);  
 Outcomes of judicial review, as an important type of independent external assessment 
of the analysis undertaken by HCC. We consider both annulments of infringement 
decisions in the courts of first instance and final annulments (ordered by higher 
courts)50. We note that the means of the two variables do not coincide ( 
 Table 4); the mean of final annulments is almost double, in our sample, since every 8th 
decision upheld by the court of first instance is annulled by the higher court (ANNUF, 
FANNUL, respectively); 
 Duration of the anti-competitive investigation (in days) as the indicators of the 
resources spent by HCC considering the case (DUR).  
 
The Table below summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables we use, for all of our 
datasets: 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of infringement decisions in the dataset of HCC (other than 
Exploitative conduct) 
Variables Description 
Total 
Number of 
observations 
Share51 St. Dev. Min Max 
Conduct group variables 
G1 
Price fixing, bid rigging, 
boycotts, market 
sharing and exclusive 
69 0.174  0 1 
                                                     
only the article / type of behaviour that the infringement was ascertained. In cases where the infringement is 
ascertained for both articles / types of behaviour, we count both infringements (see also above).    
We haven’t included in our database the interim and referrals decisions of the CA. 
We haven’t included the acquittal or commitments decisions. 
50 Final Annulment that might be the Court of any instance (either Court of Appeals or Supreme Administrative 
Court). Also, Final Decisions, decisions that have been annulled or upheld, or that no claims for annulment have 
been filed (i.e. in 8 cases). 
51 The share can be calculated using the numbers in Table 6 and  
Table 7 below. For example, for Conduct group variables, e.g. G1, we calculate: N cases of G1 (=12)/ Total N cases 
(=69). For Legal standards applied, e.g. LSI =2, we calculate: N cases of LSI (=16)/ Total N cases (=69).   
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Variables Description 
Total 
Number of 
observations 
Share51 St. Dev. Min Max 
territories 
G2 
Concerted practices 
and coordination 
69 0.159  0 1 
G3 
RPM min, RPM max, 
vertical exclusionary 
agreements, exclusive 
territories 
69 0.362  0 1 
G4 
Exclusive contracts, 
tying and non-price 
discrimination 
69 0.304  0 1 
Legal standards applied 
LSI = 2 S2: {A, B} 69 0.232  0 1 
LSI = 3 S3: {A, B, C1} 69 0.493  0 1 
LSI = 4 S4: {A, B, C1, C2} 69 0.246  0 1 
LSI = 5 S5: {A, B, C1, C2, C3} 69 0.029  0 1 
Outcomes of judicial review 
APPEALED 
=1 if the infringement 
decision is appealed, =0 
otherwise 
69 0.870  0 1 
ANNULF 
(Annulment 
in the first 
instance) 
=1 if the infringement 
decision is annulled by 
the court of first 
instance, =0 otherwise 
69 0.145  0 1 
FANNUL 
[final 
(court) 
annulment] 
52 
=1 if the infringement 
decision is finally 
annulled after all 
instances,  
=0 otherwise 
69 0.290  0 1 
                                                     
52 Cannot be / have not been further appealed. 
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Variables Description 
Total 
Number of 
observations 
Share51 St. Dev. Min Max 
Costs of litigation 
DUR 
Duration of CA’s 
investigation (in days / 
years)  
69 2110.25 1214 175 5933 
Violator-specific characteristics 
SIZE 
=1 if market share is 
>50%,  = 0 if otherwise 
(Market share of 
investigated parties) 
69 0.696  0 1 
MONPEN 
=1 if monetary 
payments are imposed,   
= 0 if otherwise  
(Sanction) 
69 0.855  0 1 
    Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
3.3 Legal standards in Greek competition enforcement: empirical analysis 
3.3.1 EBS scores and LSI scores over time 
This section provides statistical analysis for the EBS and the LSI measured using the approach 
described above. The objective of this description is threefold. We want first, to assess the time 
trends in the application of economic analysis in Greek competition enforcement; second, to 
analyze the degree of standardization (consistency) of the approach that the Greek authority 
adopts regarding different allegedly illegal types of conduct; and third, to compare the 
empirical estimate of LSs (the LSI) to the LSs suggested by modern economic theory. 
 
Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics of legal standards in the investigation of particular 
conduct groups. As we notice, in all of its cases, the HCC undertakes a basic analysis of the 
market characteristics of the investigated cases (even in cartel cases). This could be attributed 
to the need a.) to measure the implicated parties market shares (product and the geographic 
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market) in order to apply or not also Article 101 TFEU53 (along with GCA) and b.) the size of the 
implicated parties and the impact of the infringement is usually taken (as an aggravating factor) 
into account for the calculation of the antitrust fines. However, the hypothetical monopolist – 
although referred to by the European Commission‘s guidelines on market definition54 – has 
only been used in two instances55 since its use requires information on price elasticities, which 
is often unavailable. What we also notice is that HCC has made effort to establish harm to 
competition (C2) in some cartel cases (around 40% of cartel cases) during the examined period. 
These cases mainly concerned price fixing cartels to producers (i.e. buyers’ cartels); the HCC 
tried to prove statistically, as well as economically, the effects of the infringement in order to 
show that the cartel had an impact on the market (due to factors, such as buyer power). Finally, 
efficiencies defences were examined only in two decisions. 
 
Table 5: Blocks of analysis per conduct group, HCC  
  A = 1 B1 = 1 B2 = 1 B = 1 C1 = 1 C2 = 1 C3 = 1 D = 1 
Group 1 
(N=18) 18 18 0 18 2 8 1 0 
Group 2 
(N=13) 13 13 0 13 8 5 0 0 
Group 3 
(N=25) 25 25 1 25 22 5 0 0 
Group 4 
(N=21) 21 21 1 21 21 9 1 0 
Total (N=77) 77 77 2 77 53 27 2 0 
  100.0% 100.0% 2.6% 100.0% 68.8% 35.1% 2.6% 0.0% 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
                                                     
53 Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), 
OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 81–96, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52004XC0427%2806%29. “The Commission holds the view that in principle 
agreements are not capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member States when the following cumulative 
conditions are met: (a) The aggregate market share of the parties on any relevant market within the Community 
affected by the agreement does not exceed 5 %, and (b) In the case of horizontal agreements, the aggregate annual 
Community turnover of the undertakings concerned in the products covered by the agreement does not exceed 40 
million euro. In the case of agreements concerning the joint buying of products the relevant turnover shall be the 
parties' combined purchases of the products covered by the agreement”. 
54 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A31997Y1209%2801%29.  
55 Note that from the database, B2=1 actually concerns the same decision; but since (as we mentioned in ftn 49) 
mixed cases, i.e. cases with alleged infringements of both articles 101 (case of vertical agreements) and 102 (cases 
of abuse of dominance) TFEU (and/or the corresponding articles of each national competition law), where the 
infringement is ascertained for both articles / types of behaviour, we count them for both infringements. 
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Table 6 below summarizes intertemporal descriptive statistics of legal standards in the 
investigation of particular types of conduct groups, as well as the outcomes of judicial review. 
The data should be interpreted with caution, since the number of the observations is small and 
the structure of the database change over time. The data differ for different time periods and 
different conduct groups. 
However, we can reach a number of interesting/important observations. First, the extent of 
economic analysis, measured either by the EBS or LSI is average (close to 3 when the maximum 
value is 6) – indicating that average (close to TEB) legal standards are adopted. Also, even 
though absolute decisions numbers over time change, they demonstrate an increasing trend, 
mainly G1 and G2; while the trend for G3 and G4 is rather stable. Regarding, the average LS 
score, overall, we observe an increasing trend; which also stands for all conduct groups, but for 
G4. This could be considered as an indication that HCC when it applies Article 102 in its 
decisions, maintains a “conservative” approach, relying essentially on the formalistic type of 
these. This conclusion of increasing trend is also true for decision annulment, even though the 
number of our observations is quite small. The share of finally annulled decisions was stable 
and started to decrease since 2006; but it increased in 2009 and 2011. However, for each of 
the groups of (type of) conduct the trends, regarding the share of finally annulled decisions, are 
not obvious. 
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Table 6: EBS and LSI for different types of conducts and conduct groups (HCC, 199756 – 2017)  
HCC,  
All non-exploitative 
conduct 
  
1997 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 
Av. 
For 
period 
EBS MEAN 2.00 2.00 2.67 3.25 3.50 3.00 3.33 3.11 3.33 3.63 3.20 3.00 2.75 3.14 3.00 3.25 2.43 3.06 
  N 1 2 3 4 2 3 3 9 6 8 5 6 4 7 3 4 7 77 
LSI (Set) MEAN 2.00 2.00 2.50 3.25 3.50 3.00 3.33 3.11 3.33 3.63 3.20 3.00 2.67 3.33 3.00 3.25 2.43 3.07 
  N 1 2 2 4 2 3 3 9 6 8 5 5 3 3 2 4 7 69 
Share of appealed 
cases 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.83 1.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.88 
Share of finally 
annulled cases 
1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.29 
BY CONDUCT TYPE 
Group G1 
EBS MEAN       2.00 3.00 2.00  3.50 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.00  2.00 2.6157 
 N       1 2 1  2 2 2 3 1  4 18 
LSI (Set) MEAN       2.00 3.00 2.00  3.50 2.00 2.00    2.00 2.42 
 N       1 2 1  2 1 1    4 12 
                                                     
56 In 1996 no antitrust decision was concluded with infringement. 
57 High scores for years 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014, relate to supply cartel cases, where extra economic analysis was undertaken. 
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HCC,  
All non-exploitative 
conduct 
  
1997 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 
Av. 
For 
period 
Share of appealed 
cases 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.83 
Share of finally 
annulled cases 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 
Group G2 
EBS MEAN   2.50 2.50 4.00 3.00  3.50      3.00   3.00 3.00 
 N   2 2 1 2  2      1   3 13 
LSI (Set) MEAN   2.00 2.50 4.00 3.00  3.50         3.00 3.00 
 N   1 2 1 2  2         3 11 
Share of appealed 
cases 
0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.82 
Share of finally 
annulled cases 
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 
Group G3 
EBS MEAN 2.00 2.00  4.00 3.00 3.00  3.00 3.50 3.40 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50  3.08 
 N 1 2  1 1 1  4 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 2  25 
LSI (Set) MEAN 2.00 2.00  4.00 3.00 3.00  3.00 3.50 3.40 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.50  3.08 
 N 1 2  1 1 1  4 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 2  25 
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HCC,  
All non-exploitative 
conduct 
  
1997 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2017 
Av. 
For 
period 
Share of appealed 
cases 
1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.96 
Share of finally 
annulled cases 
1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
Group G4 
EBS MEAN   3.00 4.00   4.00 3.00 3.67 4.00 3.00 3.33 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00  3.48 
 N   1 1   2 1 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 2  21 
LSI (Set) MEAN   3.00 4.00   4.00 3.00 3.67 4.00 3.00 3.33 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00  3.48 
 N   1 1   2 1 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 2  21 
Share of appealed 
cases 
0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.86 
Share of finally 
annulled cases 
0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.24 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset, N = number of observations 
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3.2.2 Weighted Average Legal Standards (WALS) and indicators of legal uncertainty and of the 
quality of enforcement 
 
Table 7 provides information about the share of the value (between 1 and 6) of the EBS and 
LSI indicators for our four main conduct groups. We observe that variations in both the EBS 
and LSI are very large, demonstrating absence of consistency in the use of legal standards in 
assessing any given group of conduct. For example, in Group 2, in 45% of the cases LSI is 3 
(i.e. the TEB LS is applied), while in another 27% of the cases LSI is 2 and in another 27% LSI is 
4. This implies that, from the point of view of firms, there is a high degree of legal uncertainty 
in the enforcement of competition law that we also measure empirically and show in  
Table 8 together with a number of other indices. The same conclusion stands also for Groups 
3 and 4; while in Group G1, in 83% of the cases LSI is 2 (i.e. the MPS LS is applied) and in 
another 8% of the cases LSI is 5 (i.e. a FEB LS is applied).  
 
Table 8 deepens the statistical analysis by presenting measures of the weighted average legal 
standard (WALS) adopted and of both the quality of enforcement and legal uncertainty. We 
consider several indicators of the deviation of legal standards from what is considered best 
practice in international antitrust enforcement: deviation from the WALS, from the legal 
standard with the highest share and from the two neighboring legal standards with the 
highest cumulative share in the sample.  
WALS is calculated using  
Table 7 and is the sum of the values of LSI, each value weighted by its respective share58. The 
higher the WALS the closer is the LS to effects-based (with full effects-based requiring a value 
of 6). The first observation is that, for the conduct group (G1) that is traditionally illegal per se 
(price fixing and market sharing), the weighted average legal standard is, as expected, close 
(though not as close as it should) to 1 (the optimal value of the LS in this case). The second 
observation is that in all other cases (conduct groups G2, G3 and G4) the WALS is rather in the 
middle from its theoretical optimum (which we assume to be full effects-based): in all cases, 
the HCC is choosing LSs that are much closer to TEB than to effects-based.  
Two indicators in  
Table 8 measure legal (un)certainty. The first is the index of the concentration of legal 
standards (the HHI concentration index calculated as the sum of the squared shares multiplied 
by 100) and the second is the standard deviation of LSI. The concentration of LSI is rather low 
(with highest attained for conduct group G1) indicating that HCC’s approach to assessment is 
not predictable. This fact indicates that HCC oscillates between TEB and ITFEB, with the 
exception of G1, for which decisions are made using standards that are on average closer to 
per se rules.  
Two indicators measure the quality (Q) of enforcement. The first expresses the distance of 
WALS from the theoretically “optimal” legal standard. The second, measures the distance of 
most typical legal standards used by HCC from the optimal. As the value of Q increases, the 
                                                     
58 For example, the value of WALS for G1 in  
Table 8 is 2.41. This is obtained, using  
Table 7 as: 0.833*2+0.083*2+0.083*5 = 2.42. 
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quality of enforcement increases. We notice that the quality of enforcement is extremely low 
for all conduct groups except G1 (price fixing and market sharing) for which a Per Se approach 
is the appropriate one. We can also observe from  
Table 8 that Concerted Practices (G2) and Exclusionary Conducts (G4) have the lowest legal 
quality of decisions.   
Another indicator that we will use in the analysis that follows is the Weighted Average 
Annulment Rate (WAAR) for each of the LSI across the conduct groups, that is the average 
annulment rate throughout the different conduct groups. WAAR is calculated as follows: 
Let: 
Ni,j = number of decisions in conduct groups = j, j=1,2,3,4 for each LSI=I, i=1,2,…,6. 
Ti = total number of decisions for which LSI=I, in all conduct groups. 
ARi,j = annulment rate of decisions in conduct groups = j, j=1,2,3,4, for which LSI=I, 
i=1,2,…,6. Then: 𝑊𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑖,𝑗𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗𝑇𝑖4𝑗=1  
 
So (from Table 9), we notice that the annulment rate decreases when HCC uses an average LS 
(that is either TEB or ITFEB) and then increases when HCC uses a more effects-based 
approach. We will elaborate further on the interpretation of the evolution of AR when we 
discuss the empirical analysis of the effects of the LS adopted by the HCC on the probability 
of annulment by appeal courts. 
 
Table 7: Values of EBS and LSI for the different conduct groups, HCC 
  
Value of the EBS and LSI indicators 
1 2 3 4 5 6 N 
Group G1 
EBS Share   0.56 0.33 0.06 0.06     
  N   10 6 1 1   18 
LSI (Set) Share   0.83 0.00 0.08 0.08     
  N   10   1 1    12 
Appealed rate (for each 
LSI) 
Rate   0.80   1.00 1.00   0.83 
  N   8   1 1   10 
Annulment rate (AR, for 
each LSI) 
Rate   0.30         0.25 
  N   3         3 
Share of missed observations = 0.33   
 
29 
  
Value of the EBS and LSI indicators 
1 2 3 4 5 6 N 
Group G2 
EBS Share   0.23 0.54 0.23       
  N   3 7 3     13 
LSI (Set) Share   0.27 0.45 0.27       
  N   3 5 3     11 
Appealed rate (for each 
LSI) 
Rate   1.00 0.60 1.00     0.82 
  N   3 3 3     9 
Annulment rate (AR, for 
each LSI) 
Rate   0.33   0.33     0.18 
  N   1   1     2 
Share of missed observations =  0.15   
Group G3 
EBS Share   0.12 0.68 0.20       
  N   3 17 5     25 
LSI (Set) Share   0.12 0.68 0.20       
  N   3 17 5     25 
Appealed rate (for each 
LSI) 
Rate   1.00 0.94 1.00     0.96 
  N   3 16 5     24 
Annulment rate (AR, for 
each LSI) 
Rate   1.00 0.35 0.20     0.40 
  N   3 6 1     10 
Share of missed observations =  0.00   
Group G4 
EBS Share     0.57 0.38 0.05     
  N     12 8 1   21 
LSI (Set) Share     0.57 0.38 0.05     
  N     12 8 1   21 
Appealed rate (for each 
LSI) 
Rate     0.75 1.00 1.00   0.86 
  N     9 8 1   18 
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Value of the EBS and LSI indicators 
1 2 3 4 5 6 N 
Annulment rate (AR, for 
each LSI) 
Rate     0.17 0.25 1.00   0.24 
  N     2 2 1   5 
Share of missed observations =  0.00   
Total number of EBS:                                        16 42 17 2   77 
Total number of LSI:                                          16 34 17 2   69 
Total number of Appealed Decisions:            14 28 17 2   61 
Total number of (Finally) Annulled 
Decisions:                                                       
  7 8 4 1   20 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset, N = number of observations 
 
Table 8: Indicators of quality of inforcement and legal (un)certainty for particular conducts 
and conduct groups, HCC 
 
(Horizontal) 
Price Fixing 
(Horizontal) 
Concerted 
Practices 
Vertical 
Agreements 
Exclusionary 
Conduct 
HCC 
(Number of 
observations 
12) 
(Number of 
observations 
11) 
(Number of 
observations 
25) 
(Number of 
observations 
21) 
[optimal: 1] [optimal: 6] [optimal: 6] [optimal: 6] 
WALS (1 to 6) 2.42 3.00 3.08 3.48 
LS with highest share (s) 2 [0.83] 3 [0.45] 3 [0.68] 3 [0.57] 
Two LSs with highest sum 
of two neighboring 
shares  
2-(-)59 [0.83] 3-4 [0.73] 3-4 [0.79] 3-4 [0.95] 
Index of Concentrations 
of LSs [ICON (Indirect index 
of uncertainty)] 
71 36 52 47 
Index of Uncertainty [IU] 0.39 0.19 0.30 0.27 
Quality of Enforcement: 
IQ,1, 0≤ IQ,1≤5 3.58 2.00 2.08 2.48 
  Weighted Average Quality of Enforcement: 2.45 
Quality of Enforcement: 
IQ,2, 0≤ IQ,2≤5 4 2 2 2 
                                                     
59 Neighboring LSs, i.e. 1 & 3 are zero. 
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NOTES: “Optimal”: according to what economic theory suggests 
WALS= Weighted Average Legal Standard 
 𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑁 = 100 ∗ ∑ 𝑠𝑖281 , 16.66 ≤ 𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑁 ≤ 100 
IU= standard deviation of shares, 0≤ IU ≤1 
IQ,1=5-D1, D1= Deviation of WALS from optimal, 0≤ D1≤5 
IQ,2=5-D2, D2= Deviation of max share from optimal, 0≤ D2≤5 
 
Table 9: The value of WAAR for each value of the LSI, HCC 
WAAR  WAAR  WAAR WAAR  WARR 
(LSI = 1) (LSI = 2)  (LSI = 3) (LSI = 4) (LSI = 5) 
- 44% 24% 24% 50% 
        (112.5% 
increase) 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
4. Econometric analysis of the effect of legal standards on the 
probability of annulment and on the costs of enforcement 
4.1 Legal standard as a predictor of the outcome of judicial review 
This sub-section aims to assess the impact of legal standards on the probability of annulment 
of the HCC decisions (that is, on the outcome of the judicial review). As dependent variables, 
we use both the binary variable of the annulment of the HCC decision by the court of first 
instance and the binary variable of final annulment. It makes sense to look both at the 
decision of the court of first instance and at the final decision, given that, because of the easy 
and inexpensive access to litigation, in Greece decisions of first instance courts are often 
appealed to Supreme court.  
What factors are expected to influence and hence are responsible for the annulment rate of 
appealed infringement decisions that we observe in practice? One important factor is that the 
more extensive the economic analysis is, the higher the LSs adopted by competition 
authorities, the more opportunities exist for the alleged violators to criticize this analysis, 
attempting to show ambiguities, omissions or errors and, hence, to show the opposite effect 
to that shown by a CA. In other words, disputability of economic analysis increases with the 
legal standards applied60, thus increasing the probability of annulment. This is why we expect 
                                                     
60 Neven (2006), looks at all the appeals against EC decisions in the period 1994 – 2006, and computes the 
proportion of cases in which the Commission prevailed (so decisions were not annulled). He finds a success rate 
of art.82 (abuse of dominance) decisions of 98% which, as he comments, “is striking” (for mergers and art.81 
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that if CAs are well informed and always choose the LSs optimal for courts, there will be an 
increasing relationship between probability of annulment and LSs adopted.  
However, there is another factor at work that may lead to the observed probability of 
annulment to decline with LSs. This is the following. While CAs will not have incentives to 
choose LSs that are higher than those anticipated to be chosen by courts61, they might find it 
optimal to apply legal standards lower than those they expect courts to adopt. In doing so, 
they know that the probability of annulment will be higher than if the “correct” LS was 
chosen62 – the probability of annulment at the level of evidence associated with the lower LS 
will be higher than if the level of evidence associated with the “correct” LS was chosen – but 
this increase in the probability of annulment due to using the “wrong” (lower) standard is 
outweighed by the reduction in cost as a result of using the lower standard. This implies that 
we can observe that a lower legal standard (applied by the CA) is associated with a higher 
probability of annulment, when the LS is lower than that considered appropriate by the 
Courts.  
A U-shaped relation between LSs and probability of annulment can then be observed in cases 
where, when the LSs considered optimal and adopted by courts are relatively low (say, MPS 
or TEB), the CA adopts even lower LSs (so the second effect above is present), while when the 
LSs adopted by courts are higher (higher than MPS or TEB), the CA follows the courts and also 
adopts the higher LSs (so then the first effect above applies)63.  
This discussion suggests that it is not possible to predict theoretically what the empirical 
relationship between the LSs adopted and the probability of annulment will be, as this 
depends on whether the CA anticipates correctly the LSs adopted by Courts and on whether 
it adopts lower LSs than those adopted by the Courts. Our empirical results, described below, 
are consistent with a U-shaped relationship in which the increase in LSs reduces the 
probability of annulment up to some threshold beyond which the probability of annulment 
increases.  
In deriving our empirical results, we also include decision-specific binary variables for 
monetary penalties and violator-specific (market share of the company) control variables. Our 
expectations are that monetary penalties induce companies to exert greater efforts to 
provide more evidence for achieving annulments. Finally, we expect that larger companies 
(i.e. companies with larger market shares) can devote more resources to invest in the 
annulment of infringement decisions.  
The baseline regression model for testing how annulment at the first instance court is 
influenced by the legal standard adopted has the following probit regression specification: 
                                                     
cases the fraction is much lower – 75%). To explain this, he notes that “Article 82 has remained focused on form, 
whereas the merger regulation and increasingly Article 81 (at least with respect to vertical agreements) are 
focusing on effects, which involves the development of economic theories and evidence. Such differences in 
success rates are consistent with the view that the scope for disagreement (and decision annulment) is greater 
when economic theory and evidence are important. This is probably the most important insight from (our 
findings)…..” (authors’ emphasis). The evidence presented by Neven is confirmed with a larger dataset (that 
considers EC decisions until 2016) by Katsoulacos, Makri and Metsiou (2018). See also Katsoulacos (2018a) for 
an extensive discussion.  
61 Given that both litigation costs increase as LSs increase (move closer to effects-based from Per Se) and the 
probability of annulment also increases when CAs and courts move to higher LSs – by the argument just given 
above. 
62 I.e. the LS considered correct by the courts. 
63 See Chapter 1, for a model in Katsoulacos (2019a) of a reputation maximising CA whose utility declines with 
the probability of annulment derives these results.  
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𝑃(𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑓 = 1|𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙, 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖, 𝑥) = 𝛷 (𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖4𝑖=2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑀′𝑋𝑀𝑀 ′) 
 
where 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑓 = 1|𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙, 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 , 𝑥 indicates the probability that an infringement decision is 
annulled under judicial review in the first instance. The regression model for final annulment 
is similar. Using a similar model, we also check the impact of LSs on the probability of an 
appeal.  
LSIi denotes the LSI adopted by the HCC and XM denotes the set of explanatory variables 
mentioned above. 
Since the dependent variable - ANNUL (either in first instance or final annulment or appealed 
decision) - is binary we use the Probit model for binary response. Further, since what we want 
to see for interpretation are effects on the probability of ANNUL, we will use margins64 for 
different levels of LSI and for differences in levels (marginal effects). The marginal effect of an 
individual explanatory variable is a function that reads to the change in the mean value of the 
dependent variable in response to a one-unit increase in the value of the explanatory variable, 
holding constant the effects of all other explanatory variables in the model.  
 
 
Table 10 and  
Table 11 present the results for regressions in respect to LSI control variable and for all control 
variables respectively, for all observations and by group. In  
 
Table 10, the mean for the final decisions on the rate of annulment (though the effects for 
LSI5 are not statistically significant) is confirmed as calculated in WAAR Table above ( 
Table 9). The hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between LSs and probability of annulment 
seems to be confirmed. The increase in (marginal effect of) the legal standard (from MPS) up 
to TEB and then up to ITFEB (LSI = 3 and LSI = 4, respectively) on the probability of annulment 
on average is 20% less; while for a further increase in legal standard to LSI = 5, the probability 
of annulment on average is 6% more relative to its value when LSI=2; however this effect is 
not statistically significant (due to the small number of observations). Regarding MONPEN ( 
Table 11), the main result is the absence of positive impacts on the annulment rate (even 
though not statistically significant in the case of final annulments); while for the probability 
on filing an appeal, we found a statistically significant positive impact for MONPEN, as 
expected. The negative impact could partly be attributed to the fact that out of the 20 finally 
annulled cases, 3 of them (15%) concerned decisions where no monetary fine was imposed 
(either due to the limited time of the infringement, or for prescription reasons); and thus the 
sample is quite small. Finally, for SIZE, we found a statistically significant negative impact of 
                                                     
64 Margins are statistics calculated from predictions of a previously fit model at fixed values of some covariates 
and averaging or otherwise integrating over the remaining covariates. (from “margins” help): 
•“conditional margin” – response at fixed values for all covariates 
•“predictive margin” – response when at least one covariate is left to vary.  
With the “margins” command you can compute predicted levels for different covariate values or differences in 
levels (often called marginal effects), or even differences in differences. 
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the size of the implicated parties on the probability of annulment. This could also be partly 
attributed to the fact that out of the 20 finally annulled cases, 11 (55%) concerned decisions 
against parties that possessed a market share below 50% of the relevant market; this fact in 
conjunction with  
Table 4, leads to the conclusion that while most (approx. 70%, i.e. 48 decisions and of them 
40 concerned G2-G4) of the HCC’s infringement decisions concern undertaking with 
significant market shares, only (approx.) 19% of them were annulled.  
 
 
Table 10: Annulment and Appealed rate of infringement decision by the first instance court, 
and final annulment respectively (marginal effects are reported), HCC – control variable LSI 
 Final decision 
First instance 
court 
Appealed Decision  
A. Average margins of responses 
LSI = 2 
0.44*** 
(0.12) 
0.19* 
(0.1)  
0.88* 
(0.08)  
LSI = 3 
0.24 ** 
(0.073) 
0.15** 
(0.06) 
0.82* 
(0.06) 
LSI = 4 
0.234 ** 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.06)  
- 
LSI = 5 
0.50  
(0.35) 
0.5  
(0.35)  
- 
Number of observations 69 69 50 
Prob chi2 0.4359 0.4090 0.6372 
Pseudo R2 0.0328 0.0506 0.0051 
B. Marginal effects 
LSI = 2 (base level)    
LSI = 3 
-0.20  
(0.14)   
-0.04  
(0.11)  
-0.051 
(0.11) 
LSI = 4 
-0.20  
(0.16)    
-0.13  
(0.11) 
not estimable 
LSI = 5 
0.06  
(0.38) 
0.31  
(0.37) 
not estimable 
C. Average margins of responses by Group 
C.1. Group 1    
LSI = 2  
0.27** 
(0.14)   
0.08 
(0.084) 
0.8* 
(0.13)  
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 Final decision 
First instance 
court 
Appealed Decision  
 
LSI = 4 
0.02  
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
- 
LSI = 5 
0.23  
(0.34) 
0.19 
(0.33) 
- 
C.1. Group 2    
LSI = 2  
0.54** 
(0.24) 
- 
0.99* 
(0.00) 
LSI = 3 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.6** 
(0.22) 
LSI = 4 
0.08 
(0.09) 
- 
C.1. Group 3    
LSI = 2  
0.89* 
(0.12) 
0.73** 
(0.24)  
1* 
(0.00) 
LSI = 3 
0.32** 
(0.10) 
0.2** 
(0.09) 
0.94* 
(0.06) 
LSI = 4 
0.39** 
(0.16) 
0.1 
(0.09) 
- 
C.1. Group 4    
LSI = 3 
0.19*** 
(0.1) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.75* 
(0.12) 
LSI = 4 
0.25** 
(0.13) 
0.06   
(0.07) 
- 
LSI = 5 
0.77** 
(0.34) 
0.81 
(0.33) 
- 
   St. errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 11: Annulment and Appealed rate of infringement decision by the first instance court, 
and final annulment respectively (marginal effects are reported), HCC – all control 
variables65  
                                                     
65 For average responses by group, see Appendix 2. 
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 Final decision 
First instance 
court 
Appealed Decision  
A. Average margins of responses 
MONPEN 
-0.67 
(0.47)  
-0.92* 
(0.54) 
1.51**  
(0.55) 
SIZE 
-1.18**    
(0.39) 
-1.08** 
(0.45) 
-0.47 
(0.55) 
LSI = 2 
0.43*** 
(0.11)  
0.19** 
(0.09) 
0.84*  
(0.08) 
LSI = 3 
0.19** 
(0.06)  
0.12** 
(0.05)  
0.85* 
(0.05) 
LSI = 4 
0.32** 
(0.11)      
0.09 
(0.08) 
- 
LSI = 5 
0.53 
(0.33)  
0.5  
(0.34)  
- 
Number of observations 69 69 50 
Prob chi2 0.0198 0.0612 0.0352 
Pseudo R2 0.1615 0.1847 0.1955 
B. Marginal effects 
LSI = 2 (base level)    
LSI = 3 
-0.23 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.1) 
LSI = 4 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
-0.11  
(0.12) 
not estimable 
LSI = 5 
0.11* 
(0.35)  
0.30 
(0.36) 
not estimable 
   St. errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Graphs presented below visualize the estimated marginal effects on final annulment for all 
groups and by groups of conducts illustrating in most cases results that are consistent with a 
U-shaped relationship. 
 
Graph 1: Average margin response and Marginal effects of LSI on probabilities of, HCC 
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Average margin response (all observations)           Marginal effects (all observations) 
               
Average margin response - Group G1                 Average margin response - Group G2 
 
        
Average margin response - Group G3                  Average margin response - Group G4 
4.2 Legal standards as a predictor of the costs of decisions 
We use time – measured by days from the submission of a complaint to HCC (or the initiation 
date of an ex officio investigation) to the final (HCC) decision – as an indicator of the cost of 
litigation. This approach makes sense since longer litigation is expected to imply higher costs 
in person-days, expert fees and management time, for all litigation parties, as well as for 
society. CAs and undertakings bear the costs of litigation, in terms of additional resources 
used.  
The main hypothesis that we test is that litigation costs increase monotonically with legal 
standards. This is expected as a result of higher LSs requiring a greater amount and more 
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sophisticated economic analysis – something that follows from the very definition of effect-
based procedures.  
We apply OLS regression to test the hypothesis.  𝐸(𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚, 𝑥) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋1 + 𝛽3𝑋2) 
The results presented in  
Table 12 confirm partly our hypothesis. The sample shows that, on average for all legal 
standards the (probability of increase) duration of the litigation cost corresponds to similar 
percentages. One result worth mentioning is that under the low value MPS cases, a shift to 
TEB analysis (LSI3) provides a statistically significant increase in the number of days, that is it 
increases the duration of the litigation by 38%. This result is entirely consistent with our 
interpretation of the HCC adopting a lower than TEB LS when it anticipates that the Courts 
will use a TEB LS. 
Table 12: Determinants of the duration of litigation (OLS regression), HCC marginal effects 
 All claims 
Average margins of responses  
MONPEN  -0.11 
(0.26) 
SIZE  0.05 
(0.20) 
Constant  7.18* 
(0.34) 
Prob F-stat  0.2544 
Adj R-squared  0.0252 
LSI = 2 7.12* 
(0.19) 
LSI = 3  7.5* 
(0.13)  
LSI = 4  7.04* 
(0.18) 
LSI = 5  6.75* 
(0.53) 
Marginal effects  
Set  (LSI = 2 is the base level)  
LSI = 2 base level 
LSI = 3  0.38*** 
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 All claims 
(0.22) 
LSI = 4  -0.07 
(0.26) 
LSI = 5  -0.37 
(0.57)  
   St. errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5. Conclusions 
For the purposes of this paper we collected and analyzed a dataset of 77 antitrust 
infringement decisions reached by the Greek competition authority between 1996 – 2017, 
which were appealed to Courts for annulment. Our analysis contributes to the development 
of tools for the empirical measurement of the extent of economic analysis and legal standards 
in competition law enforcement. Our second contribution consists, in a detailed empirical 
description, of the role of economic analysis in Greek competition enforcement. Our 
approach allows us to precisely assess the role of economic analysis in comparison to 
judgments based on anecdotal evidence. We find both a moderate degree of economic 
analysis, closer to per se (TEB) legal standards, as well as a tendency to non-consistent 
application. In investigations of similar conducts, the legal standards applied vary quite 
substantially, creating high levels of legal uncertainty for firms that we also measure 
empirically and compare across different conduct groups, with the exception of Group G1. 
Overall, with the exception of price fixing and market sharing conducts, the quality of 
enforcement (measured by the deviation of the LSs adopted from the theoretical optimum) 
has been and remains throughout the period investigated very low. 
Next, our results are (quite) consistent with the existence of a U-shaped relationship between 
LSs and the probability of annulment. This can be supported theoretically as showing that the 
HCC adopts the wrong (lower) LSs when courts’ standards are intermediate (MPS or TEB LSs) 
but follows the courts when the LS is higher than TEB. Finally, we show that an increase in 
legal standards leads to significant additional costs, but only when moving from MPS to TEB 
analysis (that is from S2 to S3 LSI). Specifically, in terms of the time necessary for litigation to 
be completed, decisions in which the HCC applies a “more” effect-based approach (i.e. TEB) 
take longer than decisions based on more “per se” (i.e. MPS) standards.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Figure 1: Number of HCC decisions by year and by decision type  
 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
Table 13: Evolution of HCC’s decisions66 
Year 
Horizontal 
Agreements 
Vertical 
Agreements67 
Abuse of 
Dominance 
Mergers 
Interim 
Measures 
Opinions 
1995       4 2 1 
1996 2 5 4 11 4 0 
1997   2   36 4 1 
1998   4   40 6 0 
1999       51 6 0 
2000   3   48 9 1 
2001       27 2 3 
2002 2   1 11 4 1 
2003 3 1 2 13 8 1 
2004 1 3   11 3 0 
2005 2 2   14 3 0 
2006 1 3 3 13 1 1 
                                                     
66 Data from www.epant.gr (for decisions published up to 31.12.2017). 
67 Including also decisions on cases of prohibition of the abuse of a relationship of economic dependence, which, 
since 2009, is no longer applied by the HCC and is now incorporated into another body of civil legislation. 
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Year 
Horizontal 
Agreements 
Vertical 
Agreements67 
Abuse of 
Dominance 
Mergers 
Interim 
Measures 
Opinions 
2007 3 4 5 31 1 1 
2008 3 6 3 29     
2009 1 10 6 21 1   
2010 5 4 5 11 1   
2011 2 1 5 3   2 
2012 2 1 5 12 1 17 
2013 3 1 1 16   3 
2014 1   1 9   1 
2015 2 4 1 9 1   
2016     1 8   1 
2017 5 2   4 1 2 
Total 38 56 43 432 58 36 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
Table 14: Evolution of HCC’s decisions by type of decision 
CA: 
Infringement Decisions (1) 
Commitment 
Decisions (2) 
Total (1+2) 
with fine Settlement w/o fine Total 
HCC 66 4 9 79 10 89 
% 74% 4% 10% 89% 11% 100% 
1997 1   1  1 
2000 2   2  2 
2002 3   3  3 
2003 5   5  5 
2004 2   2  2 
2005 2  1 3  3 
2006 2  2 4 1 5 
2007 7  2 9 1 10 
2008 5  1 6 1 7 
2009 7  1 8  8 
2010 5   5 1 6 
2011 5  1 6  6 
2012 4   4 2 6 
2013 7   7  7 
2014 3   3  3 
2015 3  1 4 3 7 
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CA: 
Infringement Decisions (1) 
Commitment 
Decisions (2) 
Total (1+2) 
with fine Settlement w/o fine Total 
2017 3 4  7 1 8 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
 
Table 15: Share of HCC’s decisions by year and conduct type  
Year 
Horizontal 
Agreements 
(All Other) 
Horizontal 
Agreements 
(Concerted 
Practices) 
Vertical 
Agreements 
Abuse of Dominance 
1997 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
2000 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
2002 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 
2003 0.0% 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
2004 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
2005 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 
2006 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% 
2007 22.2% 22.2% 44.4% 11.1% 
2008 16.7% 0.0% 33.3% 50.0% 
2009 0.0% 0.0% 62.5% 37.5% 
2010 40.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 
2011 33.3% 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 
2012 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 25.0% 
2013 42.9% 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% 
2014 33.3% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 
2015 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
2017 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 23.4% 16.9% 32.5% 27.3% 
Source: Calculated by authors using dataset 
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Appendix 2  
 
Annulment rate of infringement decision (final court decisions), HCC – all control variables 
 Final decision 
Average margins of responses  
MONPEN 
-0.67 
(0.47)  
SIZE 
-1.18**    
(0.39) 
LSI = 2 
0.43*** 
(0.11)  
LSI = 3 
0.19** 
(0.06)  
LSI = 4 
0.32** 
(0.11)      
LSI = 5 
0.53 
(0.33)  
Number of observations 69 
Prob chi2 0.0198 
Pseudo R2 0.1615 
Marginal effects  
LSI = 2 (base level)  
LSI = 3 
-0.23 
(0.13) 
LSI = 4 
-0.11 
(0.16) 
LSI = 5 
0.11* 
(0.35)  
Average margins of responses by Group  
C.1. Group 1  
LSI = 2  
0.26** 
(0.12)   
LSI = 4 
0.03  
(0.05) 
LSI = 5 
0.25  
(0.36) 
C.1. Group 2  
LSI = 2  0.52** 
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 Final decision 
(0.24) 
LSI = 3 
0.04 
(0.05) 
LSI = 4 
0.09 
(0.10) 
C.1. Group 3  
LSI = 2  
0.87* 
(0.13) 
LSI = 3 
0.3** 
(0.09) 
LSI = 4 
0.5** 
(0.15) 
C.1. Group 4  
LSI = 3 
0.15*** 
(0.08) 
LSI = 4 
0.30** 
(0.13) 
LSI = 5 
0.79** 
(0.37) 
              St. errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Average margin response and Marginal effects of LSI on probabilities of, HCC –all control variables 
 
              Average margin response - Group G1                         Average margin response - Group G2 
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            Average margin response - Group G3                       Average margin response - Group G4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
  
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
1.
2
2 3 4
ls_ne
Predictive Margins of ls_ne with 95% CIs
0
.
5
1
1.
5
3 4 5
ls_ne
Predictive Margins of ls_ne with 95% CIs
 
46 
References 
Alexakis, M. (2001). Centre-right ideology and New Democracy: The challenge and prospects of the  
conservative camp. Greek Political Science Review 17(1), 103-139. 
Blumenberg, H. (2010). Theorie der Lebenswelt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Bolz, N. (2007). Das ABC der Medien. München: Fink Verlag. 
Βolz, N. (2017). Die Pöbeldemokratie. Cicero, No 3, March 2017. 
Bonacich, P. (1972). Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification.  
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2(1), 113-120. 
Capelos, T., Katsanidou, A. & Demertzis, N. (2017). Back to Black: Values, Ideology and the Black Box  
of Political Radicalization. Science and Society: Journal of Political and Moral Theory 35(1),  
35-68. 
Castells, M. (2009). The Rise of the Network Society. New Jersey: Wiley- Blackwell. 
Castoriadis, C. (1991). Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Castoriadis, C. (1992). Reflections on Racism. Thesis Eleven 32(1), 1-12. 
Castoriadis, C. (1997). Faire et à faire. Paris: Seuil. 
Chrysoloras, N. (2004). Why Orthodoxy? Religion and Nationalism in Greek Political Culture. Studies  
in Ethnicity and Nationalism 4(1), 40-61. 
Christopoulos, D. (1999). Law Issues of Religious Otherness in Greece. Athens: Themelio. [In Greek] 
Clauset, A., Newman, M. E., & Moore, C. (2004). Finding community structure in very large networks.  
Physical review E 70(6), 066111. 
Demertzis, N. (1994). The Selective Tradition for the Greek Political Culture. In N. Demertzis (Ed.),  
The Greek Political Culture Today (pp. 41-74). Athens: Odysseas. [In Greek] 
Demertzis, N. (1997). Greece. In R. Eatwell (Ed.), European Political Culture (pp. 107-121). London:  
Routledge. 
Demertzis, N. (2018). Don’t we suffer from the civil war trauma? Kathimerini, 13.05.2018. 
Dendrinou, V., & Varvitsioti, E. (2019). The Last Bluff. Athens: Papadopoulos. [In Greek] 
Descombes, V. (2016). Puzzling Identities. New York: Harvard University Press. 
Descombes, V. (2004). Le complément de sujet. Paris: Gallimard. 
Diamandouros, N. (1994). Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-Authoritarian Greece  
(Estudio/Working 1994/50). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales,  
Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones. 
Dianeosis (2017a). What Greeks Believe in 2017. Athens: Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
Dianeosis (2017b). Youth Unemployment and Intergenerational Relations in Greece. Athens:  
Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
Dianeosis (2018) What Greeks Believe in 2018. Athens: Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
 
47 
Reuters Institute (2018). Digital News Report 2018. Retrieved From  
http://media.digitalnewsreport.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/digital-news-report- 
2018.pdf 
Dumont, L. (1986). Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Efthymiou, M. (2017). Constants and Reversals in the Views of Greeks. Athens: Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
Featherstone, K. (2011). The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: A failing state in a skewed  
Regime. Journal of Common Market Studies 49(2), 193-217. 
European Youth Study (2018). Youth Study 2018. https://www.tui-stiftung.de/media/young-europe- 
2018-the-youth-study-of-tui-foundation/ 
Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. New York: Princeton University Press. 
Gauchet, M. (1998). La Réligion dans la Démocratie. Paris : Gallimard. 
Gauchet, M. (2005). La condition politique. Paris: Gallimard. 
Gauchet, M. (2006). Contre-pouvoir, méta-pouvoir, anti-pouvoir. Le Débat 138(1), 17-29. 
Gauchet, M. (2007). La Démocratie d’une Crise à l’autre. Paris: Cécile Defaut. 
Gauchet, M. (2016). Nous assistons à la disparition du sur-moi en politique, Le Point, 17.11.2016, p.  
36. 
Gauchet, M. (2017a). Après la crise totalitaire, l’histoire européenne doit faire face à la crise  
individualiste, Limite 7(1), 20-33. 
Gauchet, M. (2017b). Le nouveau Monde. Paris: Gallimard. 
Gauchet, M. (2017c). La guerre des verités. Le Débat 197(5), 20-27. 
Gauchet, M. (2018a). Les réseaux sociaux ont democratisés la manipulation, Le Causeur, 14.02.2018. 
Gauchet, M. (2018b). Le néolibéralisme face au risque de la liberté ans puissance, Le Journal Société  
Philo, 10.05.2018. 
Gauchet, M. (2018c). La démocratie qui vient: Entretien avec Marcel Gauchet, nonfiction.fr.,  
28.05.2018. 
Georgiadou, V. (2013). Right-Wing Populism and Extremism: The Rapid Rise of “Golden Dawn” in  
Crisis Ridden Greece. In Right-Wing Extremism in Europe. Berlin: FES. 
Georgiadou, V. (2015). Old and New Opportunities for the rise of the Extreme Right, Athens Review  
of Books, July-August 2015, issue 64. 
Georgiadou, V. (2018). The Extreme Right in Greece. Athens: Kastaniotis. [In Greek] 
Goodhart, D. (2017). The Road to Somewhere: The populist revolt and the future of politics. London:  
Penguin. 
Halikiopoulou, D. (2017). Patterns of Secularization: Church state and Nation in Greece and the  
Republic of Ireland. London: Routledge. 
Hatzis, A. (2017). The Lessons from the Crisis. Athens: Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
Herzfeld, M. (1987). Anthropology through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of  
 
48 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ioakeimidis, P. (2018) Greece-European Union: Three errors and five myths. Athens: Themelio. [In  
Greek] 
Heidenreich, E. (2014). Guide of Qualitative Interviews. Teaching material from Master Programme  
“Urban and Environment Sociology”, University of the Aegean. 
Kalogeropoulos, A. (2018). Greece – Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018.  
http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/greece-2018/ 
Kalyvas, S., & Μarantzidis, N. (2015). Civil War Passions. Athens: Metaixmio. [In Greek] 
Karvounis, P. (2017). Dianeosis: An Interview About Europe with P. Karvounis.  
https://www.dianeosis.org/2017/07/interview_georgakopoulos_karvounis/  
Katerelos, I., Tsekeris, T., and Tsekeris, C. (2013). Reflections on agent-based modeling: Simulating  
web networks. In A. Belya Kora (Ed.), Advances in Computational Modeling Research: Theory,  
Developments and Applications (pp. 117-126). New York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Kaufmann, J. C. (2012). Quand le Je est un autre. Paris: Fayard/Pluriel. 
Kaufmann, J. C. (2014). L’Entretien Compéhensive. Paris: Armand Colin. 
Kazakos, P. (2010). From the imperfect modernization to the crisis. Athens: Papazisis. [In Greek] 
Knight, D. M. (2018). Perceptions of Balkan Belonging in Post-dictatorship Greece. In D. Montgomery  
(Ed.), Everyday Life in the Balkans (pp. 188-198). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Kostis, K. (2015). The spoiled Children of History. Athens: Patakis. [In Greek] 
Kotzias, N. (2013). Debt Colony. Athens: Patakis. [In Greek] 
Koulouris, A., Katerelos, I., & Tsekeris, T. (2013). Multi-equilibria regulation agent-based model of  
opinion dynamics in social networks. Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems 11(1),  
51-70. 
Ladeur, K. H. (2007). Verantwortung für Institutionen. In L. Heidbring & A. Hirsch (Ed.), Staat ohne  
Verantwortung? Frankfurt/M.: Campus. 
Ladeur, K. H. (2012). Die neue Kommunikatios(un)ordnung und die Demokratie der Zukunft. Vortrag  
im Rahmen der 55, Bitburger Gespräche, 13.01.2012. 
Ladeur, K. H. (2016). Putting Europe back on its feet: A timely wake-up call, Verfassungsblog.de,  
22.11.2016. 
Lakasas, A. (2017). Orthodoxy is one thing with National Identity.  
http://www.kathimerini.gr/894798/article/epikairothta/ellada/ena-me-thn-e8nikh- 
taytothta-h-or8odo3ia 
Lialiouti, Z., & Bithymitris, G. (2016). A nation under attack: perceptions of enmity and victimhood in  
the context of the Greek crisis. National identities 19(1), 1-19. 
Lipowatz, T. (2014). H Ανασφαλής Ελληνική Ταυτότητα και η Αποτυχία των Νεωτερικών Αξιών [The  
Insecure Greek Identity and the Failure of Modern Values]. Science and Society: Journal of  
Political and Moral Theory 31(1), 101-119. [In Greek] 
 
49 
Luhmann, N. (1997). Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Vol. 2. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Manent, P. (2006). La Raison des Nations. Paris: Gallimard. 
Μarantzidis, N. (2017). We and Europe: The emergence of a strong Euroscepticism. Athens:  
Dianeosis. [In Greek] 
Mauss, M. (1969). Oeuvres, vol. 3, Cohésion sociale et divisions de la sociologie (ed. Victor Karady).  
Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. 
McCulloh, I., Armstrong, H., & Johnson, A. (2013). Social network analysis with applications. New  
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Mitsopoulos, M., & Pelagidis, T. (2011). Understanding the crisis in Greece: From boom to bust.  
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Moschonas, G. (2016) What Greeks believe. https://www.dianeosis.org/2016/02/ti-pistevoyn-oi- 
ellines-enas-aksiakos-xartis-tis-ellinikis-koinonias/ 
Müller, J. W. (2018). The People vs. Democracy? Project Syndicate, 06.03.2018. 
Pagoulatos, G. (2018). Greece after the bailouts: Assessment of a qualified failure (Hellenic  
Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, No 130). London: LSE. 
Panagiotopoulos, P. (2004). Political Conformism and Alternative Knowledge: The New Cult of  
Ancient Greece, New Age and the Narcissistic Emancipation. In Views of Modern  
Irrationalism. Athens: Moraitis Foundation. 
Pew Research Center (2016). Euroscepticism beyond Brexit.  
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/  
Pew Research Center (2017a). Religious belief and national belonging in central and Eastern Europe.  
https://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/religious-belief-and-national-belonging-in-central- 
and-eastern-europe/   
Pew Research Center (2017b). U.S. Image Suffers as Publics around the World question Trump’s  
leadership. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics- 
around-world-question-trumps-leadership/  
Psarras, D. (2012). The Black Book of Golden Dawn. Athens: Polis. [In Greek] 
Sen, A. (2006). Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny. New York: Norton. 
Schnapper, P. (2015). The Dilemma of Pro-European Parties in the UK: The Case of Labour and the  
Liberal Democrats Since 2010. In K. Tournier-Sol, & C. Gifford (Eds.), The UK Challenge to  
Europeanization (pp. 117-133). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Simitis, C. (2016). Is there a solution? Athens: Polis. [In Greek] 
Skoulariki, A. (2018). Conspiracy Theories Before and After the Greek Crisis: Discursive Patterns and  
Political Use of the “Enemy”. Science and Society: Journal of Political and Moral Theory 37(1),  
73-108. 
Stefanidis, J. (2010). In the name of the nation: Political culture, irredentism and anti-Americanism in  
the after-war Greece. Thessaloniki: Epikentro. 
 
50 
Teperoglou, E., & Tsatsanis, E. (2014). Dealignment, de-legitimation and the implosion of the two- 
party system in Greece: The earthquake election of 6 May 2012. Journal of Elections, Public  
Opinion & Parties 24(2), 222-242. 
Trenz, H. J., & de Wilde, P. (2009). Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as reactive  
identity formation (ARENA Working Papers No. 9). Oslo: University of Oslo. 
Tsekeris, C. (2018). Crisis, Institutions, Identities and Youth in Contemporary Greek Society. Athens:  
Academy of Athens. [In Greek] 
Tsekeris, C., Ntali, E., Koutrias, A., & Chatzoulis, A. (2017). Boomerang kids in contemporary Greece:  
Young people’s experience of coming home again (Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece  
and Southeast Europe, No 108). London: LSE. 
Tsekeris, C., Pinguli, M., & Georga, E. (2015). Young People’s Perception of Economic Crisis in  
Contemporary Greece: A Social Psychological Pilot Study (Crisis Observatory Research Papers,  
No 19). Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy. 
Tsekeris, T. (2017). Network analysis of inter-sectoral relationships and key sectors in the Greek  
economy. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 12(2), 413-435. 
Urbinati, N. (2015). A revolt against intermediary bodies. Constellations 22(4), 477-486. 
Vasilopoulou, S. (2018). The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece.  
Politics, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718770599 
Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D., & Exadaktylos, T. (2014). Greece in Crisis: Austerity, populism  
and the politics of blame. Journal of Common Market Studies 52(2), 388-402. 
Verney, S. (2011). An exceptional case? Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959-2009.  
South European Society & Politics 16(1), 51-80. 
Waldenfels, B. (1985). In den Netzen der Lebenswelt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Zaltzmann, N. (2007). L’ésprit due mal. Paris: Editions de l’Olivier. 
Zeri, P. (2017). How the Greek Radical Left and Extreme Right Are Perceiving Democracy: A Research  
Attempt at a Social Epistemological Explanation,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2907646 
Zeri, P., Tsekeris, C., & Tsekeris, T. (2018). Investigating the Macedonia naming dispute in the Twitter  
era: Implications for the Greek identity crisis (Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and  
Southeast Europe, No 127). London: LSE. 
                                
 
  
 
51 
Previous Papers in this Series 
 
143. Angelos Angelou, Preference and policy formation in international bureaucracies during 
crises: Evidence from the European Commission’s policies on debt-management, December, 
2019 
142. Persefoni Zeri, Charalambos Tsekeris and Theodore Tsekeris, The social power 
dynamics of post-truth politics: How the Greek youth perceives the “powerful” foreigners and 
constructs the image of the European partners, November 2019 
141. Ioannis Laliotis, Did the economic adjustment programmes deliver wage flexibility in 
Greece?, October 2019 
140. Özgün Sarımehmet Duman, Class struggle over absolute surplus value strategies in 
Greece: Initial response to the post-2008 economic crisis, September 2019 
139. Calliope Spanou, Competing Frames, Domestic Discretion and Uneven Outcomes: 
Administrative Reform in Greece under the Crisis, August 2019 
138. Theodore Panagiotidis and Panagiotis Printzis, What is the Investment Loss due to 
Uncertainty?, July 2019 
 
137. Ioannis Laliotis, Vassilis Monastiriotis and Giuseppe Moscelli, Summertime and the 
drivin’ is easy? Daylight Saving Time and vehicle accidents, June 2019 
 
136. George Alogoskoufis, Greece and the Euro: A Mundellian Tragedy, May 2019 
  
135. Helen Louri and Petros Migiakis, Financing economic activity in Greece: Past challenges 
and future prospects, April, 2019 
134. Vassilis Monastiriotis and Angello Martelli, Crisis, adjustment and resilience in the 
Greek labour market: an unemployment decomposition approach, March 2019 
133. Axioglou Christos, Christodoulakis Nicos, Which firms survive in a crisis? Corporate 
dynamics in Greece 2001-2014, February 2019 
132. Tsiftsoglou Anna, Greece after the Memoranda: A Constitutional Retrospective, 
January 2019 
131. Georgiadis Andreas, Kaplanis Ioannis and Monastiriotis Vassilis, The Impact of 
Minimum Wages on Wages and Employment: Evidence from Greece, December 2018 
130. Pagoulatos George, Greece after the Bailouts: Assessment of a Qualified Failure, 
November 2018 
